Second problem, of course, the Anbar, the Sons of Iraq, they are not really in any significant number of being integrated into the security forces which means is a great temptation for some of these people to again take up arms this time more against the government and against us and against Maliki.  The police and army are much better but they’re certainly not into especially the police are not entirely free of sectarianism.  Maliki has seems have been using some of the police for his own political goals using the, you know, the offering- his country has oil, offering carrots but at the same time arresting a number of Sunni leaders and trying to break up the sons of Iraq.  The [IB] still force to be reckoned whether he has been lying low but we don’t know whether they will come out.  There is also- I mentioned very briefly has strong historically split between the two families of Ayatollah was in Iraq.  Hakims who fled to Iran and fought on the Iranian side and the Sader’s with their large charitable organization who stayed there and struggled and were murdered by Saddam who feel that the Hakim faction and others betrayed the country and fought for the enemy.  Many basic common issues have not been addressed.  The oil law, for example, even though they’re going forward with bidding and contracts.  The oil law has not been passed.

They still haven’t settled with the Kurds, how that would be done.  The issues of federalism, Maliki seems to be trying to role it back and to the extent that people worry about Maliki maybe eventually becoming almost a dictator, I think that’s not very likely probably.  But down the road, as you build up these huge security forces, there’s the fear that maybe 10 years down the road you might find yourself with another general running the country.  That, of course, is impossible to predict but it is not impossible.  Corruption is still extreme in Iraq and has very deleterious effects on the operation of the government.  So, there’s still awful lot to be done.  My bottom line is minimalism.  We still haven’t won this by any means.  We, I think, have some moral obligations for the mess we’ve made and all the people who are dead because of the terrible mistakes we made in the beginning, but the really strategic argument to me is we do not want to have to go back to this country the third time and we need to do everything possible if we can to leave something more or less functioning behind, there would certainly be a certain level of violence and hopefully this- and likely this violence will not be of a degree which will destroy or seriously threaten the stability of the government.  We also need to be sure that less likely now that it does not become so unstable and, therefore, another area where Al Qaeda can continue to maintain a base and operate.