Well, we were trying all kind of strings, we and the Europeans that would maximize the incentive for Saddam to behave responsibly and increase the cost of behaving irresponsibly, and we- you know, we benefited; we sold a billion dollars worth of agriculture commodities every year, and we- people accused us of giving aid. The only people really benefited from this aid were US farmers, and we did lend him a limited amount of money on short-term credits which he was repaying regularly so it wasn’t causing anything really to us and it was keeping the Iranians, you know, the Iranians of the 1980s are not the same as they are now, many had a extremely hostile expansion as nasty regime which- for which, about which we were very worried and we were very worried particularly about Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf, and that’s really why we were trying to make sure that the Iraqis didn’t lose the war. And they couldn’t win the war in military terms and the Iranians couldn’t lose the war but we wanted to force the Iranians to give up and eventually they did.
Allan: David, thank you very much for an extremely interesting and insightful personal view. Thank you for the very good questions.
David: Thanks.
Allan: And alright.