So the one security agreement that they were a part of there was no response. SCO is one of their tenants they do economic and then one of them is security guarantees. They’ve been setting up a center for dealing with Islamic terrorist. Again the SCO’s response as well this is inter-ethnic we don’t really deal with that. And so we are not going to send and deal with it. [OSCE] has the capability of doing peace keeping and we have police forces in the Balkans quite extensively. But the [OSCE’s] response is well we have to have all 56 members agree on this and that’s not going to happen anytime shortly. So unfortunately from an international stand point in terms of the organs that might be able to intervene we’ve really seen a complete failure of all these organizations and their ability to actually respond to what we thought would be the main problem there. And so I think it’s going to require looking at these organizations, what their role what their responsibility what they are really useful for going forward. Quite bluntly if [OSCE] can’t respond to a country that has inter ethnic violence quite with the… not [IB] troops with police or peacekeeping. Then we kind of have to ask what’s the role of [OSCE] from a security standpoint quite simply? What is the role and should that be the roles and completely open question. But I think this raises an important question that as we go forward we need to ask who’s responsibility from a security standpoint is Central Asia or any of these regions if something were to happen like this? So I think that’s an open question that needs to be put out there. And with touching from one minute on US what are US interest in the region. It’s fairly simple and fairly straightforward their primary interest has been the [Monash] air base which is moving troops into Afghanistan that’s been our number one. Our second is keeping the northern distribution network open which is the land distribution and how we move supplies into Afghanistan that primarily goes through [Kyrgyzstan] but right now about 50% of all supplies going to Afghanistan are coming through the Northern Distribution Network. Now only a small percentage actually goes through [Kyrgyzstan]and a majority of that are on rail through Uzbekistan but that’s an important piece for us.
An important piece would be also to clean out what happens politically if and when we leave Afghanistan but all of that equipment has to go back out. So that Northern Distribution Network is going to stay important for the next three years let’s just say at a minimum level but that’s the primary US from a military insecurity stand point. Third, I would say would be drugs and addiction. We’re working with [IB] quite extensively rebuilt a drug training and addiction center but that’s a major issue because of the link between drugs and the funding and to terrors of drugs has been our third major interest. And then much lower, democracy promotion and even perhaps fifth perhaps humanitarian and I’m not, at this point, it’s not the appropriate forum or the discussion to argue what that priority should be but I think it’s important to identify that that is the priority. And if you look at either funding levels or level of engagement or actively doing, that’s our priority levels in the region.
So I think we have to start with that as the kind of acceptance that if that’s the reality, now where do we go from that and what issues should we be focused on? I’ll end with that. There’s others that I can go into but I was just looking at the time and I’m going too long and I do want to definitely open up for questions I want to hear Barbara’s comments and then open it up for questions so I’ll end with that. It’s been a disappointing time. It’s been a troubling time [for] someone who’s followed [Kyrgyzstan] for many years so I have very close friends there. I’ll be going back there in August for sometime. It’s been very disappointing. It’s been sad to see the ethnic violence. It’s been sad to see this. So on a personal level, it’s been disappointing. I’m hoping that the government can maintain enough control, hoping that the violence can begin to evade and I hope the international community can learn from this as we look at, how do we deal effectively with inter ethnic violence that springs up in regions like that. How do we create effective mechanisms? That’s the lesson that I hope we can take away from this.
Barbara: Thank you. Well thank you Kevin, that was very interesting and I’m sure there are lots of good questions but as the moderator, I get to ask first. So I actually have three, three things came to my mind when I was listening to your very interesting presentation. First of all, I’ve read a lot about the role of either the [Bekia] family or his supporters in the ethnic conflict and I wondered what your thoughts on that were, that also is [Meki] is hard to find evidence but the [Kyrgyz’s] government seems to think that the original government thinks that he had a hand in that. Second of all, you touched on a really interesting issue of [Kazakhstan’s] response as the OSCE chair. Kazakhstan officially seems to think that they responded appropriately and so I was wondering what your specific criticisms are and what you think they might have done differently? Then the third thing that I’m sure others are also interested in this. You have a lot of great, a lot of expertise in handling violent conflicts and you’ve also worked for the US government in [Kyrgyzstan] so as an expert with this kind of background, what do you think the next step should be? I know you had mentioned that the United States and other international actors didn’t really come, step up to the plate when they should have, but now that they have started on the humanitarian assistance. What do you think the United States could do to respond and address the still simmering tensions that are there? And then I don’t know if you want to respond to that or?