Kevin DeWitt: Maybe I’ll take those three real quick and then open it up. So first of all on the role of the family and this is a difficult one because it’s hard to disentangle basically the information that we’re getting on this is primarily coming from what the divisional government is releasing and so they have made several statements about this. They have released some phone taps they claim were taps between [Maxim Bekia] and I believe it was with his uncle or his brother. I’m forgetting who the conversation was with which it may be legitimate or it’s not. It’s hard to ascertain. I think the key thing here is the, the [Bekia] family strong family in the South, I mean there’s seven, seven or eight brothers I forget exactly but in [Jalalabad] and in certain regions they have a very powerful hold on what’s happening in certain regions. They also have a fair amount of control in the security services and to the army. So it’s a fair amount of reach that is occurring. How much were they actually engineering from behind? I don’t know and I think, this is one we may be able to figure out over time and may or may not. Was there some role that they may have been playing? I would expect so.

The main reason that I would expect so is [Maxim], the son, we know over the last five years was completely, was controlling most any major business or any business involvement that happened in the country went through him. You didn’t do investment, you didn’t do business, and you didn’t make changes in business unless it went through him in the country. That’s been the case over the last four or five years. So I would be shocked to see that when this kind of disturbance happens, he stands to loose a lot. His contacts stand to loose a lot, the people that he works with stands to loose a lot. So there’s going to be a reaction. There’s going to be a grabbing for power. There’s going to be a seizure. How much were they controlling of the drug trade is the question that I’ve been hearing a lot. That the family was, took over the control of the drug trade. I don’t know the answer to that. Maybe they do but who actually was taking the control of that? I honestly don’t know the answer to that. Do they have a role in it? Was it at least a passive level? Absolutely, is a part of this about that issue, about getting the money in the control of that drug trafficking? Completely, how much were they actually engineering? It’s hard to say but even if they were engineering some, it still spun out of control even beyond that and so really were these other layers. So the question in that sense is who lit the first match and I don’t know if we know that.

Kazaks response and I think this has to be tampered with. I think, to fairness to Kazakhstan, I think they have tried to raise the profile and done it and tried to use their leverage as the chair of the OSCE as much as they can. I think what I would have, I think and this gets a little bit to answer the third question of what could be done, I think if any of the organizations, I think OSCE could have responded a little differently and I still think it still can respond which gets under what the next steps could be. There is a history in OSCE of using what is referred to as a peace keeping or police keeping forces, and this is [precisely] what’s in [Kosovo] and what exists in the [Balkans]. These are not necessarily military troupes. They’re often police from other countries but they come in and provide a peace keeping force. And I would argue that at this time that would still be an important role for them to play, maybe it would be in partnership with [CSTO].

But I could easily imagine that you have 200 troupes or 200 police keeping forces from somewhere in Eastern Europe or in Central Europe would be ideal that are able to come, that have experience on this, they are trained, there’s really no affinity to Russia or to US or to China so you don’t have any of those issues with a very small number of people, because I really do believe that you don’t need a large number. Because the violence and crime going on now isn’t massive. There aren’t thousands and thousands of people running wild on the street. It’s very targeted, it’s a lack of faith and control in the basic structure of the government so what you have to restore is a basic functioning’s of the control of the government, so you would team, local police, with international police and they would provide basic curfews, you would provide basic stops. You would go into neighborhoods that are primarily Uzbek neighborhoods and you would then have this balance where people feel they could safely rebuild their business. They could go out in the street, they weren’t going to be harassed by [Kyrgyz] police going into the region. And I think an immediate response; I think that’s still possible. I think it’s not very likely unfortunately because I think the agreements that are going to have to come from a political standpoint. I unfortunately don’t see OSCE moving heavily on this but I think that’s something where Kazakhstan really could take the lead and really push that with US and Russia support from behind and I think that’s’ a role where US and Russia can really play a role of working together to maybe Kazakhstan puts the idea forward and then others are like yeah it’s a great idea but it has to be. I think Kazakhstan really could even be more out in front, is I think the criticism. So I don’t think they’ve necessarily been they’ve [committed] [IB] I would argue like it’s a more and more of a [home mission]. They could have done more is the way I would look at it.