On the other hand, you’re dealing with Armenia, a country that’s whole existence is built on the collective memory of the genocide. So we, we don’t understand this trauma. It’s very difficult to understand the political context and the limits of what can be done and I started that [IB] by saying, by referring to the crisis that was witnessed, experienced during the signature ceremony. Those of you remember that was in October in Zurich and Turkish delegation and Armenian delegation basically wanted to see their statements after the signature ceremony. And because the Armenian delegation’s declaration after the signature ceremony refer to the genocide and because the Turkish one, made allusions to a different concept, something that [IB] had drafted, for the minister. Then I guess, was he the minister? Yes, he was the minister. There was a crisis and for a while, there was a sense that there would be signature, that the signature would not be possible of these two protocols because of the tension between the two delegations about what was going to be said after the signature ceremony. And here’s how I start. As we once again have witnessed over the weekend, Turkey and Armenia are two traumatized nations. Reconciliation between these two nations will be much more difficult that a crisis from a signature ceremony. So in a way, that crisis itself was enough to show you how difficult this would be.

The signature ceremony itself was, I think, quite telling in terms of difficulties that one could face because not only you need to have a signature ceremony but the unit at the parliamentary ratification of these two protocols both in Turkey and Armenia. In many ways, I think many people shared my concern that the signature ceremony would be the easier part. Parliamentary ratification would be the more difficult part. I went to argue in the article that liberal intellectuals from Turkey and Armenia can communicate in English and mange to distance themselves from ethnic nationalism. In a way, this is something that is something and this is the good news story. I think you have an increasing number of people in Turkey who are able to look at what happened in 1915 at the history from a less ethnic nationalist angle and an angle that would try to empathize little bit more with Armenian, the Armenian narrative. But I argue that for ordinary Turks and Armenians who do not have the luxury of having this liberal intellectual approach, there is no such luxury. The narrative of nationalism will still be there and there’s the crucial factor of the Armenian diaspora.